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Abstract
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value
rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in
auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to bidders
who maximize value as value bidders. While simple single-object auction formats
are truthful, standard multi-object auction formats allow for manipulation. It is
straightforward to show that there cannot be a truthful and revenue-maximizing
deterministic auction mechanism with value bidders and general valuations. Ap-
proximation has been used as a means to achieve truthfulness, and we study which
approximation ratios we can get from truthful approximation mechanisms. We
show that the approximation ratio that can be achieved with a deterministic and
truthful approximation mechanism with n bidders and m items cannot be higher
than 1/n for general valuations. For randomized approximation mechanisms there
is a framework with a ratio of O(
√
m
ǫ3
) with probability at least 1− ǫ, for 0 < ǫ < 1.
We provide better ratios for environments with restricted valuations.
Keywords: value bidders, truthfulness, approximation mechanisms
1. Introduction
Auctions have received increasing attention in operations research for the co-
ordination of supply chains (Lorentziadis, 2016; Mansouri and Hassini, 2015). In
auction theory, bidders are almost always modeled as payoff-maximizing individu-
als using a quasilinear utility function. Under these utility functions the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism is the unique mechanism to obtain maximum welfare in
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dominant strategies. However, there are markets where a pure quasilinear utility
function might just not be the right assumption. Sometimes, capacity constraints
(Chaturvedi, 2015) or budget constraints (Dobzinski et al., 2012a) need to be con-
sidered which has ample effect on the equilibrium bidding strategies. Sometimes,
however, payoff-maximization might just not be the right assumption and bidders
rather maximize value subject to a budget constraint.
For example, digital advertising markets have grown substantially in the recent
years (Ember, 2015). In display ad auctions individual user impressions on a web
site are auctioned off. Advertising buyers bid on an impression and, if the bid is
won, the buyer’s ad is instantly displayed on the publisher’s site. Demand-side
platforms (DSPs) are intermediaries, who provide the technology to bid for adver-
tisers on such advertising exchanges. A number of papers describe bidding strate-
gies and heuristics in display ad auctions (Feldman et al., 2008; Ghosh et al., 2009;
Chen et al., 2011; Elmeleegy et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014, 2016). Zhang et al.
(2014) gives an up-to-date overview. In all of these papers the task of the DSP or
advertiser is to maximize the values of impressions typically subject to a budget
constraint for a campaign.
Value maximization subject to a budget is not limited to display ad auctions.
Private individuals often determine a budget before making a purchase, and then
buy the best item or set of items (e.g., cars, real-estate) that meets the budget.
Actually, in classical micro-economic consumer choice theory, consumers select
a package of objects that maximizes value subject to a budget constraint, they
don’t maximize payoff (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Maximizing value subject to a
budget constraint is also wide-spread in business due to principal-agent relation-
ships (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987). For example, in spectrum auctions, national
telecoms have different preferences for different packages of spectrum licenses based
on the corresponding net present values of business cases. These billion dollar net
present values exceed the financial capabilities of the local telecom by far, but
not those of its stakeholder, a multinational, which has mainly long run strategic
incentives of operating in the local market. Thus, the stakeholder provides the
local telecom with allowances for individual packages based on the underlying net
present value. It is well-known by practitioners that there often is a principal-agent
relationship between the shareholder and the bidding team (Shapiro et al., 2013).
Both parties determine the valuations of different allocations and the principal
then sets allowances less or equal to these valuations, which describe how high the
agent can bid in order to win a package. Shapiro et al. (2013) argue that such
pre-determined budgets have to do with capital rationing (Paik and Sen, 1995).
For agents, these allowances are like sunk costs but they have preferences to win
the most valuable packages within budget.
In this paper, we analyze truthful approximation mechanisms for value maxi-
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mizing bidders. One can think of several market types with value bidders depend-
ing on the nature of the preferences for one or more objects and of the budgets:
• Single-object markets, where multiple value bidders compete for only one
object
• Assignment markets, where each bidder is interested to win at most one out
of many objects
• Generalized assignment markets, where bidders want to win one or more
objects, they have values for each object, and an overall budget constraint
• Combinatorial markets, where bidders have preferences for and can bid on
packages of objects
In display ad auctions budgets for an advertising campaign are large compared
to the cost of an impression such that simple heuristics for online knapsack prob-
lems allow for near-optimal solutions (Borgs et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2008). In
such markets, an advertiser can consider individual impressions separately and bid
on any impression which promises a certain return on investment, i.e., a certain
ratio of expected payoff to price of an impression. We can deal with each im-
pression individually and focus on the model of single-object markets with value
bidders. A different model is that where the budget constraint is binding and
a buyer wants to buy as many objects (or impressions) as possible within bud-
get. Such an environment could be described as generalized assignment market.
Assignment markets, where each buyer wants to win at most one object are in
between. Finally, buyers might have preferences for packages of objects such as
in the spectrum auction markets in our introduction, i.e., we face a combinato-
rial market. We discuss truthful mechanisms for a number of these environments,
but focus on approximation mechanisms for combinatorial auction markets (with
a fully expressive XOR bid language). Combinatorial auction markets allow for
general preferences including substitutes and complements and the efficiency of
the mechanism is bounded just due to restrictions in the expressiveness of the bid
language.
1.1. Our results
First, we analyze a truthful Pareto-optimal mechanism for markets with value
bidders. We show that such a mechanism exists. Then we study truthful rev-
enue maximizing mechanisms. We focus on revenue rather than welfare. Social
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welfare is difficult to analyze in environments where bidders have values and bud-
get constraints.3 We show that for single-minded and single-valued value bidders
there are simple truthful mechanisms that maximize revenue, but that this is not
possible for multi-minded value bidders. Next, we explore truthful approximation
mechanisms.
The need for approximating revenue arises for two reasons. One is because the
underlying optimization problem is computationally intractable. This has been
the primary motivation for approximation mechanisms as they are described in
Nisan (2007). In contrast, we approximate revenue to obtain truthfulness. The
approach is similar to that of Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2009): We maximize
revenue without considering incentives, and refer to this as optimal revenue. We
will then say that a strategy-proof mechanism returns (at least) a ratio α of the
optimal if it’s revenue is always greater than or equal to α times the optimal
revenue.
We first look at small markets with two bidders and two items only to get some
intuition about possibilities for manipulation, and find out that with a simple as-
sumption there is a truthful deterministic mechanism with a golden approximation
factor of
√
5−1
2
. A randomized mechanism for the environment with two bidders
and two units achieves a factor of 3
4
. Unfortunately, the deterministic mechanism
cannot be extended to larger markets. The analysis of these small markets is
valuable on its own right, but it is also helpful for deriving our main result:
Theorem. The best revenue ratio achievable by a deterministic and truthful
mechanism with value bidders in a market with n bidders and m homogeneous
items is 1
n
, for any n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2.
The theorem has a straightforward extension to combinatorial markets. In
quasi-linear mechanism design, randomization is often a remedy to achieve higher
approximation ratios. Approximation mechanisms for quasi-linear bidders do typ-
ically not lead to strategy-proofness with value bidders. However, there is a recent
contribution by Dobzinski et al. (2012b), which is also truthful for value bidders
with a simple change of the payment rule.
Theorem. There exists a polynomial-time randomized mechanism for value
bidders which is universally truthful and guarantees an approximation ratio of
O(
√
m
ǫ3
) with probability at least 1− ǫ, for 0 < ǫ < 1.
3Consider the case of two bidders, one with a high value and low budget for an object, and
another one with a lower value and a high budget constraint. In a revenue-maximizing auction,
we only need to consider the willingness-to-pay for the object including the available budget and
aim for the allocation that maximizes the auctioneers’ revenue.
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1.2. Related literature
Given the substantial literature in social choice, we first position value bid-
ders in the literature. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem describes one of the
most celebrated results in social choice theory. Gibbard (1973) proved that any
non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is not strategy-
proof. Satterthwaite (1975) showed that if a committee is choosing among at least
three alternatives, then every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. There
have been a number of extensions analyzing more specific mechanism design ques-
tions for allocation problems without money, typically resulting in impossibility
results (Pa´pai, 2001; Ehlers and Klaus, 2003; Hatfield, 2009).
Quasi-linear preferences are an escape route from the impossibilities found
above. The well-known result by Green and Laffont (1979) shows that the VCG
mechanism is the unique quasi-linear mechanism, which allows for strategy-proofness
and efficiency. There is a huge literature on approximation mechanisms for quasi-
linear bidders. The computational hardness for the algorithmic problem of revenue
maximization with general valuations in combinatorial auctions is shown to be
O(
√
m) (Halldorsson et al., 2000). This is a natural lower bound on the approx-
imation factor of truthful approximation mechanisms. For quasi-linear bidders
randomized approximation mechanisms with the same approximation ratio have
been found (Lavi and Swamy, 2011; Dobzinski et al., 2012b). However, the best
deterministic truthful approximation guarantee known for general combinatorial
auctions is O( m√
logm
) (Holzman et al., 2004).
Closest to our assumptions is the model analyzed by Feldman et al. (2008) in
which bidders have an overall budget and a value for ad slots in sponsored search
and they want to maximize the number of clicks given their budget. They also
argue that a bidder is incentivized to spend the entire budget to maximize expo-
sure or the number of clicks in the market. Feldman et al. (2008) focused on the
specifics of ad slot markets with purely additive valuations for homogeneous goods
(clicks) and they consider specific scheduling constraints. The overall budget can
be seen as the budget for packages in which clicks outnumber a specific threshold.
In our model, we do not restrict valuations to be additive and we are interested
in packages of heterogeneous items and different budgets for different packages.
Recently, we became aware of a working paper by Wilkens et al. (2016), who also
motivates value maximization, but the paper has a different focus.
1.3. Paper structure
In Section 2 we introduce necessary notation and definitions used throughout
the paper. In Section 3 we present a Pareto-optimal mechanism and prove that
revenue maximization and strategyproofness in general are impossible. Section 4
focuses on approximation mechanisms in markets with two units of a good and two
5
bidders only, where we achieve good approximation ratios. In Section 5 we show
that for general markets without restrictions on the valuations no strategyproof
approximation mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio than 1
n
. In
Section 6 we introduce a randomized approximation mechanism for value bidders
with general valuations that is universally truthful. Finally, we conclude with a
summary and a discussion about future research questions.
2. Preliminaries and notations
In a combinatorial market we have m non-homogeneous items, J , one seller 0,
and n bidders, I (I0 includes the seller). Each bidder i ∈ I has a valuation vi(ai) for
any package ai ⊆ a assigned to an agent i and allocation a ∈ A, where A describes
the set of all allocations. A feasible allocation of bundles of items to bidders is
described as a =
⋃
i∈I ai with
⋂
i∈I ai = ∅ and a ∈ A. For brevity, we will drop the
subscript in ai and write vi(a), even though the bidder is only interested in his own
allocation and not the allocation overall. When we discuss combinatorial auctions
with heterogeneous items, we assume general cardinal valuations and allow for
substitutes and complements and free disposal (vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), S ⊆ T ⊆ J). In
contrast to mechanism design with quasi-linear utility functions where utility is
defined as valuation minus price of a bundle, ui(a) = vi(a)−pi(a), we assume that
these bidders have no value for residual budget or payoff, but they want to win
their highest-valued package subject to some budget constraint bi.
There are different ways, how budget can be considered. In combinatorial
markets the value of larger packages of objects a can exceed the overall budget
constraint vi(a) > bi(a). This can also happen in single object auctions. In this
paper we are concerned with maximizing revenue, and we consider the willingness-
to-pay for a package rather than the true value and trim the valuation of such
packages to the amount of the overall budget constraint bi. For example, a telecom
in a spectrum auction market might have a very high value for the package of all
spectrum licenses in the market, but it has only one million dollar budget available.
Therefore, we assume that his value, i.e., willingness-to-pay, for the package of all
licenses is vi =$1 million.
4 In summary, the value bidders’ utility function is
ui(a) = vi(a) if pi(a) ≤ vi(a), and ui(a) = −∞ otherwise. This means, utility
is non-transferable between the value bidders in our model. The values vi are
4A generalized assignment market which allows bids on individual objects and with overall
budget constraints is different. If bidders cannot reveal their willingness-to-pay for all packages,
but only the valuations for individual objects, then the utility of a buyer can be described as a
0/1 knapsack problem. We do not consider this setting further in our article, but focus on the
more general combinatorial markets, which allow for the submission of XOR package bids on all
possible packages.
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assumed to be monotone non-decreasing (free disposal) and they are normalized
with vi(∅) = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Note that value bidders would not bid beyond their valuation vi(a), even if
their overall budget bi is not binding. For example, an advertiser on a digital
advertising exchange does not want to have an allocation which is within his overall
budget bi, but where he has to pay more for every impression than what the net
present value for these impressions is. In spectrum auctions, principals typically
determine a budget for different packages, which is based on the net present value
of the licenses in the package. The management needs to consider these limits and
cannot bid beyond.
We consider an offline environment, where we can match bidders to objects in a
single step. We will start discussing the simplest variant of a combinatorial auction
market in our paper: the multi-unit package auction. In a multi-unit auction we
have m identical units of an item. We use the notation of an n × m auction to
point to a multi-unit auction with n bidders and m identical items or units. In a
multi-unit auction we use the notation (s1, s2, . . . , sn) to denote an allocation in
which si units are assigned to bidder i. We focus on package auctions, because
without package bids, bidders cannot express their preferences for complements
or substitutes, which can lead to arbitrarily low revenue with general valuations.
Moreover, in a multi-unit market we use vi(s) to describe the valuation of bidder
i on s units. When an auctioneer presents a bidder with a package s, and the
bidder responds with his value vi(s), we will also refer to this as a value query
(Nisan and Segal, 2006). The optimization goal is to find an allocation of objects
to the bidders, where bidder i gets si units, with
∑
i si ≤ m, that maximizes
revenue
∑
i vi(si). Let us now introduce relevant terms from mechanism design.
Definition 1. A (direct revelation) mechanism is a social choice function f : V1×
...×Vn → A and a vector of payment functions p1, ..., pn, where pi : V1×...×Vn → ℜ
is the amount that player i pays.
Vi ⊆ ℜA describes the set of possible valuation functions for bidder i. We
sometimes refer to the social choice function as the allocation rule of a mechanism.
Definition 2. A mechanism (f, p1, ..., pn) is called incentive compatible if for every
bidder i, every v1 ∈ V1, ..., vn ∈ Vn and every v′i ∈ Vi, if we denote a = f(vi, v−i)
and a′ = f(v′i, v−i), then ui(a) ≥ ui(a′).
We will also talk about a truthful or strategy-proof mechanism in this context
when truthtelling is a dominant strategy.
Desirable goals in mechanism design are Pareto optimality, the maximization
of social welfare, and revenue. Utilitarian social welfare functions add up the value
of each individual in order to obtain society’s overall welfare. As indicated earlier,
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the notion of social welfare is difficult if bidders have budget constraints. In this
paper we focus on maximizing the auctioneers’ revenue. In other words, vi(a) is
the willingness-to-pay of a bidder i for a package a (eventually trimmed to bi),
and the auctioneer wants to maximize the sum of these values in the allocation:
fR = maxa∈A
∑
i∈I0 vi(a). Assuming that every bidder is telling the truth, fR
states the optimal revenue or is optimal, for short.
The other desirable goal in mechanism design is Pareto-optimality.
Definition 3. A pair of allocation and payments (a, p1, . . . , pn) is Pareto-optimal if
for no other pair (a′, p′1, . . . , p
′
2) are all bidders and seller better off, ui(a
′) ≥ ui(a),
including the seller
∑
i∈I p
′
i ≥
∑
i∈I pi, with at least one of the inequalities strict.
A quasi-linear mechanism is Pareto-optimal if in equilibrium it selects an al-
location or choice a such that ∀i∀a′, ∑i vi(a) ≥ ∑i vi(a′). Therefore, an alloca-
tion that solves the social welfare maximization problem is Pareto optimal. In a
non-quasi-linear environment with value bidders, maximizing social welfare is a
sufficient, but not a necessary condition for Pareto-optimal allocations with value
bidders.
Example 1. To see this consider an example with bidder 1 interested in item A
for $8 and B for $5, and a bidder 2 with a value of $7 for A and $6 for B. If
the auctioneer allocates B to bidder 1 and A to bidder 2 with the price equal to
their bid, then the utility of the auctioneer and the two bidders would be (12, 5, 7)
rather than (14, 8, 6) in the social welfare maximizing allocation. Both allocations
are Pareto-optimal, though.
A mechanism is individually rational if bidders always get nonnegative utility
(Nisan, 2007). Most of our analysis focuses on individually rational and truthful
approximation mechanisms for value bidders. The algorithmic problem of find-
ing the optimal social welfare for general valuations in combinatorial auctions is
O(
√
m) (Halldorsson et al., 2000), which is a natural upper bound on the approx-
imation factor of truthful approximation mechanisms. For quasi-linear bidders
randomized approximation mechanisms with the same approximation ratio have
been found (Lavi and Swamy, 2011; Dobzinski et al., 2012b).
The algorithmic problem of allocating multiple units of an item to multi-minded
bidders reduces to the knapsack problem, for which a simple greedy algorithm
proves an approximation ratio of 2 (Lawler, 1979; Lavi and Swamy, 2011). Just
like for the knapsack problem, the algorithmic allocation problem can be approx-
imated arbitrarily well and has an FPTAS: approximation ratio of 1 + ǫ obtained
in time that is polynomial in n, log m, and ǫ−1. For quasi-linear bidders, the
framework by Lavi and Swamy (2011) can be used such that any approximation
algorithm witnessing an LP integrality gap can be transformed into an algorithm
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that is truthful in expectation. For the multi-unit auction problem the integrality
gap is 2 and, hence, the framework of Lavi and Swamy gives a 2-approximation.
Dobzinski and Dughmi (2009) presented an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that
is truthful in expectation for quasi-linear bidders.
3. Pareto-optimality and revenue maximization
We will first analyze if revenue maximization and Pareto efficiency can be
implemented in dominant strategies with value bidders. Due to the revelation
principle, we limit ourselves to direct revelation mechanisms.
3.1. Truthful and Pareto-optimal mechanisms
Because our setting is similar to the setting without money, achieving strategy-
proof and Pareto-optimal mechanisms might seem impossible at first sight. How-
ever, payments are available and provide an escape route from the many impos-
sibility results in mechanism design without money. In the following we show
that there exists a Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof mechanism for the problem,
which is a simple greedy algorithm similar in spirit to (Lehmann et al., 2002).
Definition 4 (PO auction). Given a set of items J and bidders I, find the i ∈ I
and S ⊆ J with the highest vi(S). Allocate S to i at the price equal to vi(S), and
recurse on (J \ S) and (I \ {i}).
For the following theorem, we assume that bidders have strict valuations. That
is, for all bundles S, and T in the bidder i’s demand set, we have that vi(S) 6= vi(T ),
for all bidders i ∈ I. This is a reasonable assumption for example in spectrum
auctions, where it is unlikely that two different packages have the same value. We
will discuss truthful mechanisms for general valuations including ties in Section 5.
Theorem 1. The PO auction is a deterministic, strategy-proof, and Pareto-optimal
mechanism for value bidders with strict valuations.
Proof. LetW denote the set of winning bidders who get a bundle when the auction
ends. Assume w.l.o.g. that bidder 1, bidder 2, . . . , bidder |W | are added to
W (removed from I) in order in subsequent iterations. We prove that no other
allocation Pareto-dominates the allocation chosen by the algorithm.
In any other allocation, what bidder 1 gets must be the same as what is assigned
to him by the algorithm, because he has already received his most preferred bundle
and his preferences are strict. Thus, changing the bundle will decrease his utility.
As a result, we consider the reallocation of other items not assigned to bidder 1.
But these items are exactly equal to J at the second iteration of the algorithm. We
can repeat now the same argument for bidder 2 and his received bundle. Contin-
uing with this line of arguments for |W | iterations, we can conclude that no other
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allocation Pareto-dominates the allocation chosen by the algorithm. Moreover,
because bidders pay their bid, the utility of the auctioneer is maximized under the
current allocation. Thus, the outcome of the mechanism is Pareto-optimal.
The mechanism is truthful because at each iteration of the algorithm, the only
way to get a package by a bidder is to bid higher than his true budget in order to
have the highest bid for any bundle of available items, which leads to a negative
utility in case of winning. Bidding lower cannot increase the chances of winning
either.
It is easy to see that the mechanism achieves the best possible revenue in multi-
unit markets with linear valuations. However, the revenue of the mechanism in
general can be as low as 1
n
of the optimal revenue (see Example 2).
Example 2. Suppose in a multi-unit market, bidders have valuations vi(1) =
x + ǫ, vi(2) = x + 2ǫ, . . . , vi(m) = x+m · ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, and i ∈ I. With these
valuations, the mechanism will return revenue of x+m ·ǫ. But the optimal revenue
can be higher than n·x. Thus, the mechanism returns a result with a revenue lower
than 1
n
of the optimal revenue.
Note that if the mechanism chooses the revenue-maximizing allocation based
on the bids it would not be strategy-proof any more because bidders could shade
lower-valued bids in order to get a higher valued package, as we will discuss in the
next section. We will discuss the goal of revenue maximizing mechanisms next.
3.2. Truthful mechanisms maximizing revenue
Let’s first consider the trivial case of a single item only. A direct pay-as-bid
revelation simply gives the item to the highest bidder. Reporting the truth is
a weakly dominant strategy for this mechanism. All bidders will report vi(a),
since they pay what they bid but have no value for payoff. The losing bidders
cannot gain from decreasing their bid, but would risk making a loss if they bid
beyond their valuation. The same result can be extended to single-minded and
single-valued value bidders.
Definition 5. (Lehmann et al., 2002) A valuation v is called single-minded if
there exists a bundle of items S∗ and a value v∗ ∈ R such that v(S) = v∗ for all
S ⊇ S∗ and v(S) = 0 for all other S. A single-minded bid is the pair (S∗, v∗).
Definition 6. (Babaioff et al., 2009) A bidder i is a single-valued (multi-minded)
value bidder if there exists a real value vi > 0 such that for any bundle S ∈ J ,
vi(S) ∈ {0, vi} and vi(T ) = vi for all T ⊇ S if vi(S) = vi. Both the bidder’s value
and his collection of desired bundles are assumed to be private information, known
only to the bidder himself.
10
We will refer to single-minded or single-valued value bidders as single-parameter
value bidders.
Definition 7. (Mu’Alem and Nisan, 2008) A social choice function with single-
parameter value bidders is called monotone in vi, if when valuation vi makes bidder
i win, then so will every valuation v′i ≥ vi.
Theorem 2. A mechanism (f, p1, . . . , pn) with single-parameter value bidders is
incentive compatible if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. f is monotone in every vi.
2. Every winning bidder pays his bid.
Proof. (If part) When a bidder has to pay his bid, he has no incentive to bid higher
than his true valuation. Also, the bidder has no incentive to bid lower because
of two reasons. First, he has no value for the leftover money as he is a value
bidder. Second, monotonicity of the mechanism implies that the bidder will never
be better off by bidding lower than the true valuation.
(Only-if first part) If f is not monotone then for some v′i < vi we have that the
bidder wins while he loses with vi. Then the mechanism will not be truthful since
the bidder is incentivized to lower his bid from vi to v
′
i.
(Only-if second part) Assume a bidder pays p which is less than a winning
bid v′i, i.e. p < v
′
i. This v
′
i might be an untruthful bid. The mechanism cannot
verify it. The true valuation might have been losing vi, where vi = p < v
′
i. Thus,
without paying the bid, the bidder is incentivized to bid higher to ensure winning,
harmlessly.
Notice that with single-minded or single-valued value bidders the winner de-
termination problem to select the revenue-maximizing allocation is still NP -hard
(Lehmann et al., 2006). Theorem 2 allows us to use the existing monotone approx-
imation algorithms for the allocation problem in markets with single-minded or
single-valued value bidders which are such that the computational hardness can-
not be ignored (for such approximation algorithms, refer to Nisan (2007)). With
a pay-as-bid payment rule such single-parameter value bidders would not have an
incentive to deviate from truthful bidding. Unfortunately, these positive results
do not carry over to multi-minded value bidders with general valuations.
Theorem 3. There is no strategy-proof and revenue maximizing auction mecha-
nism for general value bidders and more than one object for sale.
Proof. Suppose there is a supply of 2 homogeneous units of an item. Bidder 1 has
a value v1(1) = x and v1(2) = x + ǫ, ǫ > 0, while bidder 2 has v2(1) = x. The
allocation maximizing revenue fR is to assign one unit to bidder 1 at price x and
one unit to bidder 2 at the similar price with an optimal revenue of 2x. Bidder 1
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can increase his utility to x+ ǫ, by bidding on two units only and pretending that
his value for 1 unit is null. This way fR allocates two units to bidder 1. Thus,
bidder 1 has an incentive to shade his bid for one item. Payment rules other than
a pay-as-bid rule do not set incentives for value bidders to bid truthfully because
value bidders do not maximize payoff but value.
In the quasi-linear setting, assignment markets allow even for strategy-proof
ascending auctions (Demange et al., 1986). Unfortunately, the negative result in
Theorem 3 even holds for assignment markets, where value bidders can only win
at most one from multiple items.
Corollary 1. There is no strategy-proof and revenue maximizing auction mecha-
nism for value bidders in assignment markets.
Proof. Suppose there is a market with two items A and B and two bidders. Bidder
1 has a value of x for item B, while bidder 2 has a value of x for item A and a
value of x+ ǫ for item B. Bidder 2 can increase his utility by bidding 0 for item A,
which would make him win item B and lead to a revenue of 1
2
of the optimal.
One escape route from these negative results on strategy-proof and revenue
maximizing auctions is to give up on optimal solutions and restrict attention to
approximation mechanisms to achieve strategy-proofness. In other words, we try
to keep strategy-proofness at the expense of optimal revenue. There is a growing
literature on approximation mechanisms for quasi-linear bidders (Lavi, 2007) and
it is a natural question to understand approximation mechanisms for value bidders.
4. Approximation mechanisms for markets with two bidders
In this section, we deal with truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-
minded bidders. We impose truthfulness as a constraint and analyze if mechanisms
with a good approximation ratio of the optimal revenue are possible. We will first
focus on 2 × 2 markets and introduce an assumption when good approximation
ratios are possible. We will refer to this as the public strongest bidder assumption
which is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Public strongest bidder - PSB). With public strongest bidder (or
for short, PSB) assumption, it is publicly known which bidder has the highest bid
on all items. This means, when bidder k is the public strongest bidder it is publicly
known that vk(J) ≥ vi(J), k 6= i ∈ I.
While this might look like an strong assumption at first, such asymmetries
in a market can often be observed (Maskin and Riley, 2000). For example, in
many spectrum auction markets, there is a national carrier and it is public knowl-
edge that he will have the highest willingness-to-pay for his most desired package
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(Klemperer, 2002). In the following, we assume that bidder 1 is the strongest
bidder, when the PSB assumption is satisfied.
First, we show that there is a strategy-proof polynomial-time mechanism with
a good approximation ratio for the 2× 2 market (2 bidders and 2 units) assuming
the PSB assumption. The golden ratio mechanism for two units of a homogeneous
item and two bidders works as follows.
Definition 9 (Golden ratio mechanism). 1. Case 1: v1(2) > v2(2). If v2(1) >√
5−1
2
v1(2) then assign one item to each bidder. Otherwise, assign both items
to bidder 1. The winners pay what they bid for the units assigned to them.
2. Case 2: v1(2) = v2(2). If there is any i ∈ {1, 2} such that vi(1) >
√
5−1
2
vi(2),
then assign one item to each bidder. Otherwise, assign both items to one of
the bidders, uniformly at random.
Note that the approximation ratio r =
√
5−1
2
can be derived from the golden
ratio, which is 1/r. Note that we always assume free disposal, such that two items
are worth at least the value of one item.
The PSB assumption is required for the golden-ratio mechanism. For example,
for the true valuations shown in Table 1, the golden ratio mechanism assigns both
units to bidder 1.
1 2
1 64 100
2 55 56
Table 1
But without the PSB assumption bidder 2 could get one unit by pretending
v2(2) = 101, because the mechanism will assign one unit to each bidder.
Theorem 4. The golden ratio mechanism for the 2 × 2 market is strategy-proof
and its revenue is at least
√
5−1
2
of the optimal revenue under the PSB assumption.
Proof. The mechanism executes either Case 1 or Case 2. Due to the PSB assump-
tion, the bidders cannot decide which case to be executed. Thus, we can consider
the revenue ratio and truthfulness of each case, separately.
Let r =
√
5−1
2
. It is easy to see that in every assignment by Case 1 of the
mechanism the lower bound of the optimality is respected.
In terms of truthfulness, in Case 1 if any bidder wants to get a more valuable
package, he has to increase the bid for that package which means he has to pay
more than his true valuation. Thus, no bidder has an incentive to change the bids.
Without the PSB assumption, bidder 2 could pretend to be the high bidder on
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1 2
Bidder 1 x− ǫ x
Bidder 2 r · x+ 2ǫ r · x+ 3ǫ
Table 2
1 2
Bidder 1 0 x
Bidder 2 r · x+ 2ǫ r · x+ 3ǫ
Table 3
two units with v1(1) >
√
5−1
2
v2(2), in order to win one unit rather than nothing at
all.
In the tie-breaking situation handled in Case 2 of the auction, the assignment of
one unit to each bidder obviously respects the ratio. In case any of the bidders gets
both units, still the ratio is respected. Assume w.l.o.g. bidder 1 gets both units.
For every i ∈ {1, 2}, we have that vi(1) ≤ r · v1(2), thus
∑
i∈{1,2} vi(1) ≤ 2r · v1(2),
then v1(2) ≥ 12r
∑
i∈{1,2} vi(1) ≥ r ·
∑
i∈{1,2} vi(1).
Case 2 of the mechanism is also truthful. Suppose both bidders get one item
because for bidder 1 we have v1(1) > r · v1(2). Now if he wants to get both items,
he has to bid lower for one item. But, what he gets then is 1
2
v1(2) in expectation,
and 1
2
v1(2) < r · v1(2) < v1(1). Moreover, when any of the bidders gets two units
randomly, if a bidder wants to get one unit for sure, he has to bid beyond his true
valuation on one unit which results in a loss in case of winning. Thus, in case of
a tie, bidders have no incentive to lie about their valuations as well.
As the next theorem shows, this ratio of optimal revenue is tight and no deter-
ministic, and truthful mechanism can achieve more.
Theorem 5. There is no deterministic mechanism for the 2× 2 market which is
strategy-proof and its revenue is more than (
√
5−1
2
+ ǫ) optimal even under the PSB
assumption for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. We set r =
√
5−1
2
. Consider the valuations shown in Table 2.5
In this case, giving both items to bidder 1 will result in a less-than-r ratio of
the optimal revenue, since
x
r · x+ 2ǫ+ x− ǫ <
x
r · x+ x = r.
Thus, we choose to give one item to each bidder. Now consider the new valu-
ations shown in Table 3.
5Throughout the paper when valuations are shown in tables, the rows are representing bidders
and columns are the number of units and thus each cell shows the valuation of the corresponding
row bidder for the number of units in the column. For example, in the Table 2 the valuation of
bidder 2 for one unit is v2(1) = r · x+ 2ǫ.
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Here, the best revenue is presented by the assignment of two items to bidder 1,
but this cannot happen because then bidder 1 has an incentive to pretend having
valuations as in Table 3 when his true valuations are as given in Table 2. Thus,
the best possible ratio of revenue in this case will be r·x+2ǫ
x
≃ r + ǫ =
√
5−1
2
+ ǫ.
Randomization is often used in the design of quasi-linear mechanisms. In what
follows, we present a randomized truthful mechanism for 2 × 2 markets which
yields a better approximation factor. As usual, we say a mechanism is truthful in
expectation if for every bidder i, every v1 ∈ V1, ..., vn ∈ Vn and every v′i ∈ Vi, if we
denote a = f(vi, v−i) and a′ = f(v′i, v−i), then E[ui(a)] ≥ E[ui(a′)].
Definition 10 (Randomized 2× 2 Mechanism). 1. If vi(2) > vj(2) with i, j ∈
I, then set q =
vj(1)
vi(2)
. Assign each bidder a single unit with probability q and
assign both units to bidder i with probability 1 − q. The winners pay what
they bid for the units assigned to them.
Theorem 6. The randomized 2 × 2 mechanism is truthful in expectation and its
expected revenue is at least 3
4
optimal revenue.
Proof. First, we discuss the revenue ratio. We assume w.l.o.g that v1(2) > v2(2).
Let us use a simpler notation by setting β = v1(1), θ = v1(2), and α = v2(1).
1 2
Bidder 1 β θ
Bidder 2 α
Table 4
In order to see the ratio of the mechanism we consider two cases: θ ≥ α + β,
and θ < α + β. First, θ ≥ α + β. Here the ratio of the mechanism will be
α
θ
(α + β) + (1− α
θ
)θ
θ
≥ α
2
θ2
− α
θ
+ 1 ≥ 3
4
.
The first inequality is because β ≥ 0. Second, α + β > θ. Then the ratio of
the mechanism will be
α
θ
(α + β) + (1− α
θ
)θ
α + β
≥ α
θ
+
θ − α
θ + α
≥ 2(
√
2− 1).
The first inequality is because β ≤ θ, and the second inequality is because the
minimum of the expression occurs when α = (
√
2− 1)θ. Thus, the minimum ratio
will be 3
4
.
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1 2 3
Bidder 1 x x+ ǫ x+ 3ǫ
Bidder 2 x x+ ǫ x+ 2ǫ
Table 5
1 2 3
Bidder 1 x x+ ǫ x+ 3ǫ
Bidder 2 0 x+ ǫ x+ 2ǫ
Table 6
The mechanism is truthful as it is shown in the following. The bidder who
has the higher valuation for two units will get one unit with probability one. If
a bidder wants to increase his bid for two units beyond his value to become the
highest bidder for two items, he will also incur a loss with positive probability. If
the strong bidder on two units submits a bid that is different from his value for
one unit, this does not impact the probability of winning two units.
If the weak bidder on two units submits a bid on one unit, which is higher than
his value he might incur a loss with positive probability. If this bidder bids less
than his value, he just decreases his chances of winning even a single unit.
Notice, that for the randomized mechanism, no PSB assumption was necessary.
Having the golden ratio mechanism under the PSB assumption, there is hope to
find deterministic approximation mechanisms for markets with more items or more
bidders as well. But, unfortunately as the following theorem states the mechanism
is not extensible even for 2× 3 markets.
Theorem 7. There is no mechanism for the 2× 3 market which is deterministic,
strategy-proof, and its worst-case revenue is more than (1
2
+ ǫ) optimal even under
the PSB assumption.
Proof. Suppose there is. Consider the following valuations in Table 5 with two
bidders and three homogenous items.
The mechanism must assign one unit to one bidder and two units to the other
bidder, otherwise the mechanism returns a low ratio of 1
2
+ ǫ and the theorem
holds. Assume w.l.o.g one unit is assigned to bidder 2 and two units to bidder 1.
Now, consider the new valuations in Table 6.
If bidder 2 obtains two or three units by bidding 0 for one item, he would have
an incentive to lie when his true valuations were as given in Table 5. Therefore,
the only solution of the new valuations is the assignment of three units to bidder 1.
However, this valuation is only (1
2
+ ǫ) optimal. If bidder 2 is still assigned 1 unit
and bidder 1 is assigned two units as for Table 5, the revenue is also only (1
2
+ ǫ)
optimal, and the auctioneer could be made better off, by allocating three units to
bidder 1, without decreasing the utility of any other participant. Therefore, there
is no truthful mechanism, which can achieve a higher approximation factor.
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With a symmetric argument we get the following result for a market where
bidders are interested in two items and the bundle of both items.
Corollary 2. There is no mechanism for two bidders and two heterogeneous items
which is deterministic, strategy-proof, and with a worst-case revenue more than
(1
2
+ ǫ) optimal even under the PSB assumption.
Consequently, the best possible approximation factor achievable by a deter-
ministic mechanism for two bidders and two items is (1
2
+ ǫ) which is what we can
gain by the assignment of all items to the strongest bidder.
5. Deterministic mechanisms for general value bidders
In this section, we characterize properties of truthful revenue maximizing mech-
anisms for value bidders in general. This allows us to answer the question whether
an approximation ratio better than 1
n
is possible for markets with n bidders. This
is what we can achieve when bidders are only allowed to submit bids on the grand
bundle (the bundle of all items). We try to analyze this by characterizing the al-
location rule of all possible truthful mechanisms. We present our negative results
for multi-unit auctions which are a subset of combinatorial auctions.
Generally speaking, with value bidders at most one value query for each bidder
can be verified by a truthful mechanism. This severely restricts the possibility
of designing deterministic truthful mechanisms. One observation from the golden
ratio mechanism and the randomized 2× 2 mechanism is that only a single value
query for one package S is used by the auctioneer, i.e., only a single value vi(S)
of each bidder is considered and then the bidder can either win this package or a
lower valued one. An example for another allocation rule f in a 3×4 market which
satisfies the same properties is: ”if v1(4) > v2(2)+v3(2) then (4, 0, 0) else (0, 2, 2).”
In this example, each bidder can only win the package, which is evaluated in the
condition of the allocation rule or the empty set. No bidder has an incentive to lie
in the value query, because this package is assigned to the bidder.
5.1. Allocation rule revisited
We restrict our attention to those valuations of bidders which make the alloca-
tion rule assign all units to only one bidder. These valuations play an essential role
in defining the outcome of the allocation rule and we discuss this further in this sec-
tion. We first define two new notations. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V1× . . .× Vn point
to an arbitrary set of valuations. We denote by (i ←֓ s) the assignment in which
s units are assigned to bidder i. Given an allocation rule f : V1 × . . .× Vn → A,
we define a new function
Fi : V1 × . . .× Vn → {true, false}
Fi(v) =
{
true if f(v) = (i ←֓ m),
false otherwise.
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Intuitively speaking, Fi determines whether a set of bidders’ valuations will
result in the assignment of m units to bidder i. Notice, Fi(·)’s are disjunctive, i.e.
Fi(v) & Fj(v) = false, ∀i, j ∈ I, because the grand bundle cannot be assigned to
more than one bidder, simultaneously. Now, using Fi’s we redefine the allocation
rule as follows.
f ∗ : V1 × . . .× Vn → A
f ∗(v) =
{
(i ←֓ m) if Fi(v) = true , ∀i ∈ I,
f(v) otherwise.
Example 3. Consider the following allocation rule for the 3× 4 market.
1. If v1(4) > max(v2(4), v3(4)) ∧ (v1(4) > v2(2) + v3(2)) then (4, 0, 0).
2. If v2(4) > max(v1(4), v3(4)) ∧ (v2(4) > v1(2) + v3(2)) then (0, 4, 0).
3. If v3(4) > max(v1(4), v2(4))
4. If v1(4) > max(v2(4), v3(4)) then (0, 2, 2).
5. If v2(4) > max(v1(4), v3(4)) then (2, 0, 2).
In this allocation rule, the functions Fi(·)’s are defined as follows. F1(v) ≡
v1(4) > max(v2(4), v3(4)) ∧ (v1(4) > v2(2)+v3(2)), F2(v) ≡ v2(4) > max(v1(4), v3(4))
∧ (v2(4) > v1(2)+ v3(2)), and F3(v) ≡ v3(4) > max(v1(4), v2(4)). These functions
are disjunctive and all might become false simultaneously.
This new rewriting of the allocation rule will be useful for deriving a general
result in mechanism design for value bidders as will be shown in the following.
It is easy to observe that the two definitions of the allocation rule are equivalent.
However, for the sake of completeness, we give the proof in the following.
Lemma 1. For any set of valuations v ∈ V1× . . .×Vn, we have that f ∗(v) = f(v).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary set of valuations v. To show the claim, we must prove
that f ∗(v) = f(v). We divide the argument into two cases.
1. ∃i ∈ I to whom all units are assigned. By definition, f(v) = (i ←֓ m). Then,
Fi(v) = true , per definition. Thus, f
∗(v) = (i ←֓ m), the desired conclusion.
2. ∄i ∈ I to whom all units are assigned. Then, Fi(v) = false, ∀i ∈ I, per
definition. Then again per definition, f ∗(v) = f(v), the desired conclusion.
That f ∗ and f are equivalent, lets us focus on f ∗ and try to find conditions
which f ∗ must satisfy in order to achieve a good revenue as well as obtaining
truthfulness.
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5.2. Properties of Fi(·)
The domain of function Fi(·) is the set of all valuations. Thus, one might guess
that in computing Fi(·), the valuations of bidders for any bundle j ≤ m might be
queried. Yet, in what follows we present multiple lemmata which show that this
is not the case and restrict the arguments of Fi(·) to only valuations of bidders for
m units: vj(m) ∀j ∈ I.
We first look at the lemma which describes properties of mechanisms, which
avoid low revenue.
Lemma 2. In order to avoid arbitrarily low revenues of less than 1
n
, arguments of
function Fi(·) must include all value queries vj(m), ∀j ∈ I, i.e. Fi(·) has to be a
function of all vj(m)’s.
Proof. We show that, in case, there exists a bidder whose valuation for m units
is not queried in computing Fi(·) then f ∗ might end up in an allocation with
arbitrarily low revenue of less than 1
n
. We divide the argument into two cases.
1. vi(m) is not queried in Fi(·). Thus, the mechanism decides if all items
are assigned to bidder i without evaluating his valuation. Now consider a
situation in which Fi(·) = false. Here, bidder i does not get the grand
bundle m. However, he can have an arbitrarily high valuation for getting
the bundle. Thus, the revenue of the mechanism can become arbitrarily low
in comparison to the optimal one.
2. vj(m), j 6= i is not queried in Fi(·). This vj(m) can be arbitrarily high.
Thus, without considering it, in case of Fi(·) = true , the revenue-ratio can
become arbitrarily low.
Therefore, Fi(·) has to query all vj(m)’s, j = 1, . . . , m. This completes the
proof.
The second lemma holds only for value bidders. This lemma takes into account
the truthfulness of mechanism.
Lemma 3. In order to obtain truthfulness, no valuation from bidder i other than
vi(m) can be queried in computing Fi(·).
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume apart from vi(m) there is another
valuation of bidder i queried in computing Fi(·). Then, the bidder can manip-
ulate this additional value query to make Fi(·) = true . To see how this can
happen, let us call this additional variable as vi(k), k < m. Assume w.l.o.g. that
Fi(vi(m), vi(k), . . .) = false, and Fi(vi(m), v
′
i(k), . . .) = true . Then bidder i will
be better off by reporting v′i(k) rather than vi(k) and the mechanism cannot set
incentives for truthful bidding.
19
Lemma 4. If two bidders are equal in all valuations except for the grand bundle,
then in case the mechanism wishes to assign the grand bundle to one of them, it
must assign the grand bundle to the stronger bidder, otherwise the mechanism will
be neither revenue maximizing nor truthful.
Proof. Assume two bidders i, j ∈ I are equivalent in everything except for the
grand bundle for which vi(m) > vj(m). Also, assume that the mechanism assigns
the grand bundle to bidder j.
The mechanism is also not revenue maximizing because it can get a higher
revenue by assigning the grand bundle to bidder i.
The mechanism is not truthful because the true bid by bidder j might have
been v′j(m) > vi(m). Thus, under this selection, the stronger bidder is incentivized
to shade his bid for the grand bundle.
The next lemma proves that, by taking into consideration the truthfulness, if
all units are assigned to a bidder, that bidder has to be the strongest on the grand
bundle.
Lemma 5. If Fi(v) = true then vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m), ∀i, j ∈ I, otherwise the
mechanism is not truthful.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Let v be an arbitrary set of valuations.
Let Fj(v) = true , for a bidder j. Assume, there exists a bidder i such that
vi(m) > vj(m). By our assumption Fi(v) = false. We must prove that such a
mechanism cannot be truthful.
If the valuations of bidder j were such that ∀s < m, vj(s) = vi(s), he certainly
had no chance to get the grand bundle because based on Lemma 4 when the
mechanism wishes to assign the grand bundle to one of these two bidders, the
winner will be bidder i. Thus, there could have been a lie by reporting v′j(s) 6= vi(s)
for some s < m to get to this status in which Fi(v) = false, and Fj(v) = true .
Now, because all m units are assigned to bidder j, the mechanism has no way to
prevent his possible lie on smaller number of units, i.e. vj(s), ∀s < m. Thus, there
exists an incentive for bidders to misreport their valuations on s and therefore the
mechanism cannot be truthful.
Considering Lemma 5, we can be more specific about the function Fi(·) as the
following lemma states.
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Lemma 6. The rewriting of function Fi(·) as the following is without loss of
generality. Fi(v) = (vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m)) ∧ F ′i (v), where
F ′i : V1 × . . .× Vn → {true, false}
F ′i (v) =


true if Fi(v) = true,
false if Fi(v) = false ∧ vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m),
don’t care vi(m) < maxj 6=i vj(m).
Proof. Based on Lemma 2, in Fi(·) all valuations for the grand bundle must be
queried. Thus, the inclusion of all vj(m)’s in the redefinition of Fi(·) follows this
very point. We can iterate over the four cases defined by Fi(v) = true|false and
vi(m) > | < maxj 6=i vj(m). The only case not supported by the new definition
is Fi(v) = true and vi(m) < maxj 6=i vj(m). But, based on Lemma 5, this case
is impossible. Thus, the new rewriting is without loss of generality, the desired
conclusion.
In the next lemma, we show that when a bidder has the highest valuation for
the grand bundle, he will get the all units. In order to show this, we draw on a
property of social choice functions, namely anonymity. Anonymity requires that
the outcome of a social choice function is unaffected when agents are renamed.
Lemma 7. If vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m) then Fi(v) = true, ∀i, j ∈ I, otherwise the
mechanism is not truthful.
Proof. Suppose ∃i ∈ I, and v ∈ V1 × . . . × Vn such that vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m)
and Fi(v) = false. We prove that such a mechanism will be manipulable. By our
assumptions, no bidder gets the grand bundle. Thus, a bidder j 6= i gets r < m
units.
vj(r) must have been queried in Fi(v) and therefore in F
′
i (v). Querying any
other valuation vj(t), 0 < t ≤ m, t 6= r in F ′i (v), makes the mechanism manipula-
ble. That is bidder j can manipulate the mechanism in the following way. Assume
F ′i (vj(t), . . .) = true then bidder j can report v
′
j(t) such that F
′
i (v
′
j(t), . . .) = false
and then ending up in the assignment which assigns r units to him. The mechanism
has no way to prevent such a lie and therefore it is manipulable. We emphasize
that even querying vj(m) in F
′
i (v) makes the mechanism manipulable as follows. If
vj(m) has caused F
′
i (v) = false, a lower value of v
′
j(m) could let it be true. Thus,
when the true valuation of bidder j is v′j(m) he can be better off by reporting
vj(m), instead. Notice that we have assumed some valuations of any bidder j
is queried in F ′i (v) because without this assumption, F
′
i (·) is a function without
arguments and therefore we have Fi(v) = true when vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m) and
we are done.
Thus, we learn that when r units are assigned to bidder j, no valuation of
bidder j rather than vj(r) can be queried in F
′
i (·). Now, consider this from the
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reverse angle. That one valuation of bidder j, i.e. vj(r), which is queried in F
′
i (·),
in case F ′i (v) = false, becomes winning and the corresponding number of units (r)
gets assigned to the bidder. Therefore, for all valuations which do not end up in
the assignment of the grand bundle to bidder i, the mechanism always assigns a
fixed number of units to bidder j.
The mechanism is assumed to be anonymous (not depending on the labels of
the bidders), therefore for every bidder we get a fixed assignment. Moreover, in
an anonymous mechanism bidders are symmetric, therefore every bidder will get
a fixed assignment of m
n
units.
Up until now, we learn that the mechanism will either assign the grand bundle
to a bidder or will assign m
n
units to any bidder 6. Moreover, we know the following
about the arguments of any function F ′i (·). The only valuation of bidder i queried
in F ′i (·) is vi(m), based on Lemma 3, and the only valuation of any bidder j queried
in F ′i (·) is vj(mn ), based on the argument above.
But, such a mechanism is not truthful. Let s = m
n
. Consider a valuation v
where vi(m) > vj(m) > maxk∈I\{i,j} vk(m), F ′i (v) = false and F
′
j(v) = true . This
can happen when vi(s) = 0, and vj(s) ∼= vj(m) ∼= vi(m). Notice, it is assumed
that vi(s) is influential in F
′
j(v) and thus sometimes can change the value of it.
Now, consider a decrement in the value of vi(m) to v
′
i(m) < vj(m). With this
new valuation v′, we have Fj(v′) = true. Notice, F ′j(v
′) will remain true since it’s
arguments are untouched. Thus, v′ is manipulable by bidder i by increasing v′i(m)
to vi(m) > vj(m) in order to get s units. Thus, allowing the assignment of s units
to any bidder makes the mechanism manipulable.
This impossibility arose because while vi(m) > maxj 6=i vj(m), we assumed
Fi(v) = false. Thus, if vi(m) is the highest bid on the grand bundle, we will
always have Fi(v) = true , the desired conclusion.
Example 4. Consider the allocation rule given in Example 3. Obviously, the
allocation rule is not anonymous since the outcome depends on the label of the
bidders. If bidder 3 has the highest valuation for the grand bundle, he will get it
but for bidder 1 and 2 this does not hold.
In addition, the mechanism is not truthful. Consider a case in which v1(4) >
v2(4) > v3(4), v1(4) < v2(2)+v3(2), and v2(4) < v1(4)+v3(2). The outcome of the
mechanism in this case will be (0, 2, 2). But, bidder 1 can be better off by bidding
v′1(4) < v2(4), for which the outcome will be (2, 0, 2).
6This mechanism is already of approximation 1
n
. Let s = m
n
. Consider a set of valuations
where ∀i ∈ I, vi(t) = 0, when t ≤ s and vi(t) ∼= vi(m), for t > s, and all the valuations for
the grand bundle are approximately the same. Then if the mechanism assigns either the grand
bundle to one bidder or m
n
units to each bidder, the approximation ratio will be of 1
n
.
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Theorem 8. The best revenue ratio achievable by a deterministic and truthful
mechanism with value bidders in an n×m market is 1
n
.
Proof. According to Lemma 7, the allocation rule assigns everything to the bidder
with the highest bid for the grand bundle. This assignment has a worst-case
approximation ratio 1
n
.
Theorem 8 is easily extensible to combinatorial markets as the following corol-
lary states. Overall, there is a gap between the best approximation ratio of an
approximation algorithm to the set packing problem (O(
√
m), and the best truth-
ful approximation mechanism.
Corollary 3. The best revenue ratio achievable by a deterministic and truthful
mechanism with value bidders in a combinatorial market is 1
n
.
6. A randomized mechanism for general value bidders
In the previous section, we focused on deterministic mechanisms for value bid-
ders and found an approximation ratio of only 1
n
. It is interesting to understand,
if randomization can help achieve better bounds. For example, in Section 4, we
have proposed a truthful randomized mechanism for 2× 2 markets that improves
on the approximation ratio of the deterministic golden ratio mechanism.
Randomized approximation mechanisms, which have been designed for quasi-
linear bidders do not necessarily carry over to markets with value bidders. Inter-
estingly, Dobzinski et al. (2012b) introduced a truthful and randomized approx-
imation mechanism for quasi-linear bidders which obtains an optimal O(
√
m)-
approximation to the optimal revenue for arbitrary bidder valuations. This ap-
proximation ratio is tight, because it matches the best obtainable ratio for the
algorithmic problem in polynomial time when truthfulness is not required. The
approximation scheme is also truthful in a universal sense. This form of incentive
compatibility for randomized mechanisms is stronger than truthfulness in expec-
tation, which is used in other papers (Lavi and Swamy, 2011). Truthfulness in a
universal sense requires that for any fixed outcome of the random choices made
by the mechanism, players still maximize their utility by reporting their true val-
uations. In other words, a randomized mechanism is universally truthful if it is
a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms. It is therefore
also incentive compatible for risk-averse bidders.
The general framework designed by Dobzinski et al. (2012b) for mechanism
design in quasi-linear settings, can easily be adapted for value bidders. Therefore,
we can also achieve a randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with value
bidders, which is truthful in a universal sense.
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The framework tries to distinguish two cases: either there is a dominant bidder
such that allocating all items to him is a good approximation to the revenue, or
there is no such bidder. In the first case all items will be assigned to a bidder.
In the second case, a fixed-price auction is performed, which achieves a good
approximation. In a first phase of the auction bidders are partitioned randomly
in three sets. One of these sets is then used to gather statistics in phase II, which
allow to set a reserve price in the second-price auction of phase III, which only
allocates all items to one of the bidders. If the reserve price is not met in phase
III, then the items are sold in the fixed-price auction in phase IV. We will refer to
this framework as U .
Theorem 9. A randomized mechanism according to framework U for value bidders
is universally truthful and runs in polynomial time. It guarantees an approximation
ratio of O(
√
m
ǫ3
) with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Proof. Except from the payment rule the framework U is identical to the one
described by Dobzinski et al. (2012b). Therefore, we can draw on the proof for
their main theorem to show the approximation ratio of O(
√
m
ǫ3
). Truthfulness in a
universal sense is what remains to be shown. A randomized mechanism is truthful
in the universal sense, if players still maximize their utility by reporting their true
valuations for any fixed outcome of the random choices made by the mechanism.
We show that the mechanism is truthful in each of the three partitions of bidders
STAT, SECOND-PRICE, and FIXED over which the mechanism randomizes.
Truthfulness in the SECOND-PRICE group is satisfied, because bidders can
only win the entire bundle J or nothing, which leads to an auction with single-
parameter value bidders (see Theorem 2). The fixed-price auction for the partition
FIXED is truthful as well, since the bidder will try to win the most valuable bundle
provided that his valuation is higher than the bundle price. Increasing the bid to a
value higher than the reservation price in order to get a more valuable bundle, can
result in a loss for the bidder because he has to pay more than his true valuation.
Decreasing the bid just decreases the chance of winning, but would not increase
the utility of a value bidder. Bidders in STAT never receive any items, and thus
have no incentive to misreport their preferences. This holds for quasi-linear and
for value bidders.
A randomized mechanism according to framework U is also tight as it obtains
an O(
√
m)-approximation of the optimal revenue for general bidder valuations.
This also shows, that there exists a gap between the power of randomized versus
deterministic mechanisms. Whether such a gap exists for quasi-linear mechanism
design is an open problem (Lavi, 2007).
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7. Conclusions
Quasilinear utility functions are widely used in auction theory, but real-world
bidder preferences are often different. Only recently, deviations from pure payoff-
maximization have been studied in the literature. While some of the theoretical
work tries to relax the linearity assumption to allow for more general functions
(Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015; Baisa, 2013), we look at a specific utility function
motivated by reports about industry practice in digital ad markets and other
domains. This function is characterized by value maximization subject to pre-
defined budgets. It is interesting to understand if it is possible to find strategy-
proof mechanisms for marketes with such value bidders.
Interestingly, Pareto optimality is trivially satisfied, while strategy-proof mech-
anisms that maximize revenue are impossible except for markets with single-
minded or single-valued value bidders. Approximation and randomization are
often used as tools to achieve good revenue without giving up on truthfulness in
quasi-linear mechanism design. We show that it is impossible to get an approxi-
mation ratio of more than 1
n
for the general case with deterministic mechanisms.
Only for restricted 2 × 2 multi-unit markets where the strongest bidder is com-
monly known, we propose the golden ratio mechanism with an approximation ratio
of
√
5−1
2
.
Randomization allows to close the gap between truthful approximation mecha-
nisms for value bidders and approximation ratios for the purely algorithmic prob-
lem. Here, we can draw on prior work by Dobzinski et al. (2012a), who considered
auction design with quasi-linear utility functions. Interestingly, their framework
can be applied for markets with value bidders as well.
In this paper, we do not analyze such overall budget constraints across multiple
items as in generalized assignment markets, where the bid language is restricted to
price quotes for single objects. Another avenue to explore is the restriction of the
types of valuations of bidders, which might allow for higher approximation ratios
than 1
n
for the unrestricted case. While we have analyzed restricted cases with two
units of a good and two bidders only, there might be other useful restrictions as
well.
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Appendix A. Adaptation of the framework for randomized mechanisms
by Dobzinksi et al.
Data: n bidders, each with a general valuation vi, a rational number
0 < ǫ < 1.
Result: An allocation of the items, which is an O(
√
m
ǫ3
)-approximation to
the optimal revenue.
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders
Assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets:
FIRST-PRICE with probability 1− ǫ, FIXED with probability ǫ
2
, and
STAT with probability ǫ
2
.
Phase II: Gathering Statistics
Calculate the value of the optimal fractional solution in the combinatorial
auction with all J items, but only with bidders in STAT. Denote this
value by OPT ∗STAT .
Phase III: A Second-Price Auction
Conduct a second-price auction with a reservation price of r =
OPT ∗STAT√
m
,
in which the bundle J of all items is sold to the bidders in
SECOND-PRICE. If there is a ”winning bidder”, i, allocate all the items
to that bidder, charge this bidder max(vi(J), r), and output this
allocation. Otherwise, proceed to the next step.
Phase IV: A Fixed-Price Auction
Let R = J . Let p =
ǫOPT ∗
STAT
8m
.
For each bidder i ∈ FIXED, in some arbitrary order:
• Let Si be the demand of bidder i given the following prices:
p for each item in R, and ∞ for each item in J −R.
• Allocate Si to bidder i, and set his price to be max(vi(S), p · |Si|).
• Let R = R\Si.
Algorithm 1: Randomized approximation mechanism for general bidders
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